Does the cheap-house cash flow premium survive once you net in appreciation?
Does the cheap-house cash flow premium survive once you net in appreciation?
A while back I looked at why one ZIP out-yields the ZIP next door inside the same
metro, and it came out almost entirely as a price story: the high-yield ZIP is
high-yield because the house is cheap, not because the rent is strong. The obvious
pushback is the one every cash-flow skeptic makes: cheap houses appreciate slower,
so you give the yield premium back on the value side. A yield trap. So I tested it
against current data, gross yield plus trailing appreciation, roughly 8,300 ZIPs and
695 metros.
The skeptics are partly right. Within a metro, higher-yield ZIPs really do
appreciate more slowly than their pricier neighbors, clearly negative. Sort each
metro's ZIPs into yield quintiles and the low fifth appreciated around plus 1.8
percent over the trailing year while the high fifth was around minus 1.1 percent.
That give-back ate roughly 58 percent of the yield premium.
But only 58 percent. Gross yield ran from about 3.8 to 8.8 percent across the
quintiles and total return still climbed from about 5.6 to 7.6 percent. A partial
trap, not a full one. About 42 percent of the premium survived.
The exceptions are the tell. In 79 of 87 metros the premium survived. In 8 it fully
collapsed, and those 8 were the expensive, compressed markets. San Jose was the
cleanest: the yield spread between its cheapest and priciest ZIPs is only about 2.8
points, but the appreciation give-back was about 6.7 points, so the high-yield ZIPs
lost by almost 4 points of total return. San Francisco, San Diego, Los Angeles,
Providence, Miami, Salt Lake City, and Atlanta rounded out the eight. Contrast the
survivors, all cheap-basis markets with wide within-metro yield spreads: Birmingham
had an eleven-point total-return edge for its high-yield fifth even after the
give-back, St. Louis about eight, Baltimore and Rochester about six. So it is really
a rule about spread. Wide yield spread, the premium survives. Compressed at the top,
it does not. I am naming both the survivors and the traps on purpose, because this is
a description of how prices are distributed inside these metros, not a buy list.
I stress-tested the snapshot, since trailing 12-month appreciation in a cooling year
is a weak proxy for a hold. The negative relationship held at 3 and 5 years, same
sign, just milder. And over a real 2023 to 2026 hold, annualizing actual home-value
growth, the premium survived more clearly, not less, about a three-point edge.
Two honest limits. Only about a third of ZIPs carry a usable rent index, so this
skews denser. And it is all gross and backward-looking, no financing or costs, so it
does not forecast your return.
What I am chewing on: in your own buys, when you took a high cash-flow cheap-basis
property, did the slower appreciation actually show up over your hold, or did the
cash flow carry it? And in a compressed high-cost metro versus a cheap one, do you
screen differently given the spread point?
David
Most Popular Reply
Agree with what Jason is saying. The lower cost real estate is disproportionately impacted by capex and opex. The real estate is rarely sustainable. The spread sheet cash flow is often a product of deferred maintenance and deferred cap ex, not the realities of today's cost of real estate ownership and certainly not the result of a well performing property. The real estate can't absorb the costs. If cash (rent) in and expenses and cap ex out are viewed through a lengthier time period, in most instances the better situated real estate experiences better cash flow, especially if you operate the real estate correctly. This is on top of more predictable and more consistent appreciation.
