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Michael Eskenasy
  • Investor
  • Pacific Northwest
144
Votes |
245
Posts

I think we’ve been asking the wrong question about the Smokies

Michael Eskenasy
  • Investor
  • Pacific Northwest
Posted

I've been going pretty deep on Smokies STR data lately — BiggerPockets posts going back years, actual cabin resale histories, current listings, reported rental revenue, financing, tourism, price cuts, relists, short sales, the whole mess.

And I think I finally see the thing that gets missed when people ask:

“Are Smoky Mountain STRs still profitable?”

That question is almost useless.

Two owners can own nearly identical cabins, generate almost identical revenue, and have completely different investments.

One bought in 2019 for $350k at 4%.

The other bought in 2022 for $700k at 7–8%.

Same mountain.
Same guests.
Same $70k–$80k gross revenue.

One might be thrilled.

The other might be trapped.

I’m finding actual cabins that still generate respectable rental revenue and nevertheless sold below what the owner paid in 2021–2022.

One property reportedly did about $98k of revenue in 2025 and still sold for roughly $125k less than its 2022 purchase price.

Another improved from roughly $72k gross to $77k gross, yet later sold below its 2021 basis.

That’s the part that changed how I look at this market.

Revenue recovery does not equal owner recovery.

Bookings can improve.

Occupancy can stabilize.

ADR can hold up.

And somebody can still be screwed because the problem isn’t the cabin anymore.

It’s the balance sheet.

That also explains something else I’m seeing all over the listing histories.

It’s not always:

Seller lists cabin → market crashes → seller takes huge loss.

A lot of it looks more like:

Seller lists too high → cuts price → removes listing → comes back → cuts again → waits → finally discovers where the market actually is.

That’s different from a crash.

It’s price discovery happening painfully and slowly.

And the more data I pull, the less I think “the Smokies” should even be treated as one market.

A generic woods cabin is not the same asset as a killer mountain-view cabin.

A 1BR Black Bear Falls cabin is not the same thing as a giant pool cabin.

A Starr Crest luxury cabin is not the same product as a remotely managed 2BR bought at peak pricing.

Some properties are getting crushed.

Some are basically flat.

Some still appreciate.

Some are producing six figures of gross revenue.

There are winners and losers inside the same resorts.

Which means the real underwriting question probably isn’t:

“Will the Smokies do well?”

It’s:

“What am I paying per dollar of normalized earnings, with what debt, for what specific product, at this point in the cycle?”

The other thing I found fascinating is the BiggerPockets chronology itself.

Go back through the forum and watch how the questions change.

2018–2020:

Where should I buy?
What occupancy can I get?
Can I make 15–20% cash-on-cash?

2021:

What expenses am I forgetting?

2022:

Is this market saturated?
Why does this $1M cabin still lose money at $125k revenue?

2023:

Prices seem disconnected from rents. Should I wait?

2024:

Should I sell for a loss?

2025:

Are short sales starting?

2026:

NOI is positive, but my mortgage is killing me. What do I do?

That progression is wild.

And yet this is not a “nobody goes to the Smokies anymore” story.

Great Smoky Mountains National Park still had roughly 11.5 million visits in 2025.

The destination is gigantic.

The problem appears to be that a gigantic amount of tourism demand is being divided among a huge lodging base, while a meaningful group of owners bought assets during a period when both property prices and capital were priced very differently.

That leaves me with a theory I’d love the people actually operating there to attack:

The Smokies STR market may already be recovering operationally while still correcting financially.

Those two things can happen at the same time.

Guests come back.

Revenue improves.

Good cabins perform.

And distressed inventory still keeps appearing because yesterday’s financing and acquisition basis haven’t disappeared.

If you bought a Smokies STR between 2021 and 2023, I’m especially curious:

Forget Zestimate.

Forget your original pro forma.

What did you pay, what did it actually gross last year, and if you sold it today, do you think you’d make money on the real estate itself?